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Studies examining the democratizing potential of new media have tended 
towards a somewhat myopic anglocentrism, which has characterised much of 
the ensuing debate and therefore failed to fully predict the effects in other 
contexts and cultures. While the obviously deficient media environment of the 
Arab world attracted global attention post Arab Spring, and some attempts 
have been made to examine the impact in other overtly authoritarian regimes, 
this article argues that the most revealing dynamic is elsewhere: in ‘west-
facing’ post-Soviet countries which embrace concepts of media freedom and 
democracy yet fail to fully implement them. In these media environments, 
sometimes described as ‘semi free’ (Robakidze, 2011), web access is often 
very high, partly driven by the failures of the mainstream independent press to 
capitalise on the post-Communist environment combined with recent 
limitations on the freedom of the press. Two countries on similar political 
trajectories, Ukraine and Georgia, are examined in this article. Both 
experienced so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in the early 2000s, with ‘media 
freedom’ a fundamental part of protestor’s demands, yet the underpinning 
cultural context differs considerably. Through the use of immersive interviews 
with journalists in both countries, the article identifies the emergence of ‘hub 
websites’ specialising in independent political journalism, around which an 
engaged and politically active population is coalescing.  
 
Introduction: Online political journalism in context 
 
The deficiencies of contemporary mainstream journalism generate political 
attention in many contexts and countries worldwide. Whilst it is inappropriate 
to over-generalise, the charges levelled against the industry have become 
familiar in numerous highly diverse media environments. Typically, complaints 
in Europe and North America revolve around structural problems and 
resource issues which combine with a commercial disinclination to cover 
politics to contribute to a ‘disconnect’ between the processes of democracy 
and the voting public. In other contexts, the commercial disinclination to cover 
politics is sometimes replaced by rather more serious forms of direct or 
indirect censorship and other forms of control over the press. 
 
Beckett (2008) argues that the long-running debate about the gulf between 
the democratic ideal and the prevailing reality is increasingly situated in the 
news media itself. In a climate in which the democratic function of the news 
media is increasingly called into question, a parallel growth in the scope and 
ambition of political blogs, politically-motivated social media and other forms 
of internet-enabled political communication is perhaps unsurprising, with 
several commentators arguing that the internet offers increased opportunities 
for enhanced democratic discourse. Predictions that the Internet will 
reinvigorate public debate and reconnect politicians to their public are not 
new, of course. Blumler and Coleman called for a ‘civic commons in 
cyberspace’ as early as 2001, and well before that new media environment’s 
implications for political communication were being explored by academics.  
 
Some of this early optimism about the potential of the Internet to reinvigorate 
the public sphere subsequently faded, with commentators challenging the 
more extravagant claims and arguing that new media’s democratizing 
potential and impact on journalism had been exaggerated. Entrenched 
perspectives and polarized opinions characterised the debate for many years, 
which led Agre (2002) to point out that the internet has its effect only in the 
ways that it is appropriated, and it is appropriated in so many different ways 
that nobody has enough information to add them up. More recently, Beckett 
(2008) rued the tendency to look at the post-Internet journalism business from 
two extremes. One insists traditional journalism must be defended, the other 
is unrealistically evangelical about the potential of new media. As early as 
2004, however, Gilmor rejected the polarised nature of this debate, which was 
often framed from the perspective of professional journalists expressing a fear 
of creeping amateurism. Instead, Gilmor argued there will be a mutually 
beneficial move towards an era of media literacy and what he called ‘news 
activism’, whereby web technology allows people in various global contexts to 
regain control of the news. When people become more engaged with the 
events around them, particularly when they become journalistic activists, they 
become better citizens. 
 
Gilmor’s predictions now seem prescient: since the turn of the decade there 
have been numerous signs that the former polarity has dissolved into a more 
nuanced and arguably more realistic assessment of the significance of 
prevailing trends. A renewed optimism about the democratising potential of 
the web has crept back into public debate, with an acknowledgement that 
‘citizen journalism’ can be harnessed by professional journalists to produce 
new forms of political debate. For Beckett (2010), for example, the British 
General Election of 2010 made it ‘absolutely clear that networked journalism 
had arrived’.  Coleman et al (2009) called for journalists to form a connection 
between citizens and ‘the confusing mass of online as well as offline 
information sources’, with the World Economic Forum’s global council calling 
for journalism to reconstruct its relationship with the citizen and society, 
arguing that public engagement is transforming journalism and providing a 
‘historic opportunity to create unprecedented increased value’. 
 
This renewed optimism seemed vindicated in early 2011, as developments in 
the Arab World brought many of these trends to global attention. The use of 
social media, political blogs and other forms of new media during the political 
unrest across the Arab World continues to be debated, with some arguing that 
online journalism facilitated protest and disseminated political information so 
effectively in Tunisia and Egypt that popular revolutions succeeded more 
rapidly than may otherwise have been the case. Whilst others doubted its 
efficacy and role in the political process, few would deny that the 
democratizing potential of web-based media and networked journalism had 
come of age in a context which perfectly demonstrated its possibilities in 
terms of circumventing prevailing deficiencies in the mainstream press: 
associated, as they were, with authoritarian regimes. In these ‘deficient’ media 
environments, typified by parts of the Arab world, online media gained traction 
and impact in a way that is arguably impossible in the wider Anglosphere for 
commercial and structural reasons. In other words ‘big media’, in these 
contexts, is too dominant. 
 
For this reason, it seems possible to assert that academic assessments of the 
democratizing potential of online journalism in its broadest sense have often 
been unhelpfully Anglocentric and pessimistic in their conclusions. Mason 
(2012), by contrast, argued that 2011 saw a revival of the essential appeal of 
the blogging format, and that the influence of that format was most clear in the 
Arab World, where the mainstream press have historically been subject to 
various degrees of censorship and self-censorship. For Mason, blogs exhibit a 
property that is vital ‘in theatres of revolution’, by providing ‘somewhere to link 
to’. They have come to resemble, in contexts blighted by a deficient 
mainstream media, the British newspapers of the nineteenth century: journals 
of record. Those journals of record are frequently able to gain a wider, global 
audience in the right circumstances, as the events of the Arab Spring 
demonstrated. The influence of the media in general is particularly strong in 
countries where residents depend on a limited number of news sources, and 
weaker where there are multiple sources. Guy Berger (2009) argues that web 
technology means that a new form of global journalism is now possible, where 
local reporters’ work is accessible online and the local becomes global.  
 
Deficient media environments: The global context 
 
What might be described as ‘deficient’ media environments, where journalistic 
ideals are far from realized, can be identified in very different and distinctive 
contexts. At one end of the scale are overtly authoritarian regimes like those 
of the pre-2011 Arab World. But at the other, deficiencies can often be 
identified in unexpected contexts. For example, in devolved entities across the 
EU, media portrayal of devolved politics is often compromised for structural 
and economic reasons. Wales, for instance, a devolved entity within the 
structures of the UK government, has been described as ‘a media wasteland’ 
(Davies, 2009) with no national newspaper press and an almost total 
dependence on London-based UK newspapers for political information. 
Cushion et al (2009) argue that ‘English-centric assumptions about national 
identity’ increasingly characterize UK national newspapers post-devolution, 
leading to a democratic deficit in other parts of the UK, where the nature of 
devolved governments and the policies they pursue are neither understood 
nor scrutinized.  Instead, independent political websites have begun to gain 
traction. Such sites transcend the blogging form, acting more like independent 
political news sites, and therefore become ‘hubs’ for engaged readers by 
deliberately addressing the structural and economic deficiencies in the 
mainstream (Roberts 2011). 
 
This article argues that the emergence of dominant independent ‘hub’ 
websites characterizes contemporary online journalism in many different 
global contexts, but that this trend has remained relatively under-recognized 
by analysts who have either been overly preoccupied with the use of social 
media in authoritarian countries, or overly focused on the ‘Anglosphere’. Away 
from these environments, increasingly influential ‘hub’ websites now dominate 
political debate in environments ranging from Wales (WalesHome) to Tunisia 
(Nawaat.org). Further, this article will go on to suggest that the most revealing 
context in terms of the democratizing potential of this kind of independent 
online journalism lies elsewhere, in that group of countries which arguably 
occupy a middle ground between overtly authoritarian and censorship-
dominated media environments, and those where commercial and structural 
factors are the main constraint on informed political journalism. This third 
group is perhaps best represented by the more nuanced news media 
environment characteristic of parts of the former Soviet Union.  
 
Several former Soviet states present an intriguing and potentially revealing 
paradox in their approach to media freedom, and there are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, many of the states which gained independence from 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s have smaller scale media environments than 
Russia and the ‘Anglosphere’, but also have reasonably high levels of Internet 
penetration. Secondly, several countries in the former Soviet Union have 
attempted to enshrine media freedom into their constitutions, often as an 
integral part of moves towards democratic systems of government. Finally, 
those moves towards media freedom have frequently been compromised in 
many post-Soviet societies by regimes intent on reasserting some measure of 
control over the mainstream, traditional press. In this context, the 
democratizing potential of online journalism is most clear, and again finds its 
expression in the development and increasing influence of ‘hub’ websites 
covering political debate via independent journalism.  
 
Hanitzsch et al (2011) identified a bloc of post-Communist countries (Bulgaria 
and Romania in their study) which they argued formed part of a large and 
distinctive group in terms of journalistic culture. They called this group 
‘peripheral western’, relatively close to western journalism culture as generally 
practised in North America and Western Europe, but considerably removed 
from a third group of transitional democracies and developing countries which 
included China, Egypt and Russia. However, the deliberately limited, ‘broad-
brush’ nature of this study, which sampled several countries within each broad 
journalistic culture, obscures some of the complexities of post-Communist 
development.  
 
This article argues that some post-Soviet societies, like Ukraine and Georgia, 
currently sit somewhere between Hanitzsch et al’s ‘peripheral western’ group 
exemplified by Bulgaria and Romania, and the transitional democracies group 
exemplified by Russia and China. Importantly, Hanitzsch et al found that 
journalists who have to manage in a political climate that is relatively hostile to 
press freedom and democracy exhibit smaller power distance: political factors 
are, in other words, particularly pertinent to journalists’ perceptions of media 
roles. This positioning is significant for the political trajectories of Georgia and 
Ukraine, because Splichal and Sparks (1994) argued that after the collapse of 
socialist regimes in the 1980s and 90s, Eastern European countries were 
largely caught up in imitating West European practices in economy and 
politics. Countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia all sought membership 
of the European Union and modelled their democratic structures and media 
systems accordingly. To an extent, this earlier experience illustrates the 
nature of the balancing act currently being undertaken further east in Georgia 
and Ukraine: both countries are ‘West-facing’, with an explicit political 
intention to join the EU, yet simultaneously exhibiting a realpolitik tendency for 
political elites to attempt to manage the news media. 
 
Georgia and Ukraine were among the 15 former Republics of the Soviet 
Union to begin a transition towards independence based on a market 
economy and some form of democracy in 1991. All these states have since 
experienced very different paces and trajectories of change. It could be 
argued, however, that both Ukraine and Georgia have experienced similar 
political trajectories since the break-up of the Soviet Union and are therefore 
ripe for comparative study. Both experienced so-called ‘Colour Revolutions’ in 
2003 and 2004, with media freedom seen as one of the significant gains 
resulting from 2004’s ‘Orange Revolution’ (Ukraine) and 2003’s ‘Rose 
Revolution’ (Georgia).  However, there has remained a tension between the 
need to reform the press (as ‘media freedom’ is intrinsically linked with 
democratic forms of government) and the desire to retain, or reinstate, some 
form of state control. The dynamic is intriguing and potentially reveals a wider 
truth about the democratizing potential of new media in what Robakidze 
(2011) describes as semi-free media environments: those which partially 
embrace media freedoms yet fail to fully implement them.  
 
The descriptor ‘Colour Revolutions’ is generally taken to describe as a single 
phenomenon a number of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing 
authoritarian regimes during the first half of the twenty-first century 
(O’Beachain, 2010). It has tended to encompass post-Communist countries, 
with Georgia and Ukraine the highest profile, though similar movements for 
change have been seen in various other contexts (although, as in the Arab 
World during 2011, protests have not always followed the peaceful model). 
All, however, can be summarised as attempts to challenge political elites 
through mass protest and civil society activism.  
 
Georgia and Ukraine were arguably the most significant examples of the wave 
of post-Soviet ‘Colour Revolutions’ and were certainly the highest profile 
internationally, largely because, unlike some of the other examples, the 
political histories of both countries were changed by the protests. Since the 
Colour Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, both societies have been 
characterised by similar political trajectories, with an ongoing tension between 
democratizing, EU-facing elements and a still extant Soviet mentality within 
the body politic. While this political trajectory may be similar, however, it is far 
from identical, and the cultural and geopolitical context remains highly 
distinctive. As such, a comparative study has obvious potential for revealing 
important contextual differences in the development and democratising 
potential of online journalism.  
 
To illustrate the long-term importance of these political trajectories in terms of 
the development of media and political freedoms, post-Soviet independent 
countries that did not experience colour revolutions have generally engaged in 
varied examples of containment strategies. In Russia, for example, the 
political elite appropriated the tactics of colour revolutions by establishing a 
pro-regime youth movement called Nashi. In Uzbekistan, a brutal repression 
of activists followed the Stalinist maxim: liquidate the person and you liquidate 
the problem (Fumagalli and Tordjman, 2010). Uzbekistan’s President Karimov 
has publicly argued for what he calls ‘eastern democracy’, suggesting that 
western news values and independence of the mass media are not 
appropriate for countries where there is ‘strong and enduring’ respect for 
authority. In short, individual liberties and press freedom should not extend 
beyond what is required to achieve economic development and national 
security (Shafer and Freedman, 2003).  
 
Similarly, during the ‘Arab awakenings’, the regimes in Syria, Bahrain and 
Libya adopted a hardline approach to contain the demands of the activists 
after revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt had succeeded in deposing 
authoritarian rulers. In media terms, these containment strategies express 
themselves in terms of a refusal to adopt standard practices associated with 
‘media freedom’. However, Mason (2012) is more ‘globally’ optimistic in his 
claims that what characterizes all the recent Arab uprisings is the power of the 
network to defeat elites, and that those networks are driven and facilitated by 
media technology.  
 
The nature, role, philosophy and conception of journalism itself obviously 
varies considerably around the world, with comparative approaches therefore 
particularly revealing, although still relatively rare. Hanitzsch et al’s (2011) 
comparative study of journalism cultures suggests that aspects of 
interventionism, objectivism and the separation of facts and opinion differ, 
sometimes quite considerably. In very general terms, the study found western 
journalists less supportive of the active promotion of particular values, ideas 
and social change, and more likely to adhere to universal ethical principles. 
However, even this tentative attempt at a comparative generalisation might be 
disputed by those familiar with the output of British tabloids, to take just one 
‘western’ example. The study also found that journalists from non-western 
countries are generally more interventionist and more flexible in their ethical 
views, with the active promotion of values and ideas more common in 
developing societies and ‘transitional contexts’.  
 
The perceived sanctity of the ‘Anglo-American’ or Western model cannot 
easily be subsumed into a consideration of the democratizing potential of 
online journalism. Almost by definition, online forms of journalism are less 
insular and more open to the influences of other forms of journalism: these 
may be adapted to fit local circumstances or merged with practices imported 
from elsewhere. Indeed, Seib argued in 2002 for a form of ‘global journalism’ 
as an alternative to the Anglo-American model, which requires journalists to 
understand how the links between countries affect one another in terms of 
politics culture and economics. This global journalism requires an openness 
through which new information is absorbed and understood, unlike the Anglo-
American liberal model which is characterized by a predetermined set of 
norms in which journalists seek to reconcile news narratives (Smith and 
McConville, 2011). Indeed, Fielden’s 2012 comparative study of International 
Press Councils identified the challenges shared by regulators in an era 
marked by the blurring of boundaries between converging media platforms, 
between professional and ‘citizen’ journalists and between national and global 
publication. Such a model chimes with the multi-faceted and open approach 
adopted by the ‘hub’ websites beginning to shape political debate in Ukraine 
and Georgia.  
 Defining terms: Journalism and democracy 
 
This model may represent a tempting characterisation of the open online 
journalistic model emerging in environments like Georgia and Ukraine, but 
any discussion of the democratising potential of online journalism in deficient 
media environments must acknowledge the inevitable problems of definition: 
what standards of democratisation is the study measuring both existing and 
potential future political journalism against? This is a difficult issue, and one 
that is of particular relevance in the post-Soviet environment, yet it is 
frequently ignored in comparative studies. Louw (2010) outlines the empiricist 
understanding of the world which underpins the ideals of ‘objective journalism’ 
still frequently fetishized by liberal democracies. This suggests that a real 
objective news exists ‘out there’ in the real world independent of the news 
media, whose job it is to find and record it objectively, Further, journalists are 
expected to eliminate their own subjectivity by applying journalistic formulas. 
However, this model has long been disputed by those who argue that 
journalists frequently construct the news rather than reflect it. (Tuchman, 
1978) 
 
Stromback (2006) goes some way to addressing this issue, arguing that much 
literature discussing the impact of media and journalism on democracy is 
critical of its effects on ‘democracy’ but that it frequently fails to identify news 
standards by which the quality of news journalism might be evaluated. An 
empirical approach is required if this issue is to be addressed with any clarity, 
particularly in the context of post-Soviet countries like Georgia and Ukraine, 
emerging from decades of authoritarian control and attempting to negotiate a 
route through democratisation and associated conceptions of media freedom. 
Stromback (2006) argues that few models specify with sufficient clarity the 
model of democracy to be used in normative departure, and suggests that the 
question of proper news standards cannot be addressed in isolation from the 
question of different normative models of democracy. It is, he says, only by 
specifying what kind of democracy we are referring to when using the term, 
and by specifying its normative implications for media and journalism, that we 
can fully understand how media and journalism affect democracy. It follows 
that it is not valid to claim journalism undermines or contributes to democracy 
per se. This is a particularly pertinent issue in the post-Soviet environments of 
Ukraine and Georgia, where constitutional definitions are ‘young’ and remain 
disputed following the Colour Revolutions and subsequent political upheavals 
and governmental change.  
 
The relationship between democracy and journalism has been described as a 
social contract (Locke, 1966). There is, inevitably, a certain amount of 
idealism to such definitions, which suggest journalism requires democracy as 
it is the only form of government that respects freedom of speech, expression 
and information. By respecting these freedoms, democracy fulfils its part of 
the contract, but it also requires a system for the flow of information, to 
facilitate public discussion and perform a watchdog function (Habermas, 
1989). For Stromback, defining precisely what this obligation means is 
problematic and almost inevitably controversial: what kind of information do 
the public need? On the one hand journalism is often criticized for its content 
and negative effects on some aspects of democracy. On the other, critics are 
often not clear about which democratic standard they are applying when they 
criticize the media. It is one thing to argue that the media contributes to 
political cynicism and lack of engagement, quite another to specify why and 
how this might harm democracy. The arguments of Franklin (1997) and 
McNair (2000) encapsulate this debate further. For Franklin, contemporary 
journalism (in the UK at least) increases cynicism and detachment while for 
McNair popular forms of journalism, like British tabloids, increase engagement 
and perform a useful democratic function despite the shortcomings of their 
style of reportage.  
 
In this context, claims that there is a new confidence in mainstream journalism 
partly stimulated by engagement with online journalism and user-generated 
content are lent some clarity by the more recent views of Beckett (2010) and 
Mason (2012) which suggest a new kind of networked journalism is emerging 
where news media engages with audiences to tell stories in new ways, and 
that those stories are subsequently amplified by user engagement. In 
emerging democracies like Georgia and Ukraine, the issue of defining 
standards of democracy is often clearer cut, partly because constitutional 
moves towards such definitions are more recent: indeed, clarifying the 
relationship between the news media and democracy was core to the Colour 
Revolutions of 2003 and 2004. Fielden’s study (2012) argues that, however 
press regulation is developed, the interests of the public should lie at its heart.  
 
For the purposes of this work, an attempt was made to assess interviewees’ 
views on this key theme in particular, and all were initially prompted to discuss 
what they saw as the main barriers to journalism in their countries. Such 
considerations led to discussions about the democratizing potential of online 
journalism in both Ukraine and Georgia, and inevitably, progressed to a 
consideration of the wider democratic implications of such ‘open’ forms of 
journalism as those pursued by ‘hub’ websites. Public interest was referenced 
as the idealised ‘yardstick’ of journalistic function. 
 
Georgia: An overview 
 
Both Georgia and Ukraine are multiparty democracies with a clear 
commitment to a free press, but both fail to fully achieve the idealistic aims of 
linking the two. Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
and experienced a series of political and economic crises throughout the 
1990s. The Georgian state under its first President, Eduard Shevardnaze was 
weak, rather than overtly authoritarian or liberal (Companjen, 2010). However, 
despite widespread poverty and political failure, it was the closure of the 
independent TV station Rustavi 2 in 2001 that triggered the largest protests 
against the Shevardnaze regime (Companjen, 2010). Media issues were thus 
at the heart of the debate about Georgia’s democratic progress from the 
beginning, and have remained a key issue characterising political debate in 
the country.  
 
Post-Soviet civil society in Georgia was initially stimulated through foreign 
organisations like the Soros Foundation, in which NGOs became a serious 
force in Georgian society and still fund several of the independent news 
websites cited by interviewees and discussed later in the article. The alliance 
of NGOs, reformist politicians and independent media formed a catalyst for 
the ‘Rose Revolution’ that followed the allegedly rigged elections of November 
2003. For De Waal (2010: 193) the revolution of 2003 ‘briefly electrified the 
world’, as a rare example of popular democracy in action and a compelling 
spectacle ‘pulled off with Georgian flair’. It was also the first of the Colour 
Revolutions that later removed presidents in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Events 
were highly improvised and spontaneous and derived very largely from the 
miscalculations of president Shevardnadze, despite Russian-led accusations 
that the revolutions were planned with US assistance (De Waal, 2010). 
 
After the ‘Rose Revolution’, Robakidze (2011) says that ‘everybody believed, 
but only for a while, that journalism should be serving truth and providing 
objective information to citizens’. Indeed, in 2004 Georgia adopted a new law 
‘on freedom of speech and expression’ which enshrines various media 
freedom principles within the constitution. Implementation proved more of a 
problem, and gradually the government strengthened its grip on TV media in 
particular. Print media enjoys more freedom, but circulation is very low and its 
influence limited.  
Authoritarian hints were present from the beginning of the Saakashvili regime. 
He stripped parliament of much of its powers and increased government 
control over TV stations as he turned Georgia from a semi-parliamentary 
republic into a strongly presidential one (Companjen, 2010). As early as 2004 
a group of civil society activists chided the president for being intolerant of 
criticism and a Council of Europe report concluded the media was self-
censoring and civil society weak. It could also be argued that the EU has been 
too cautious in Georgia, partly because it feels it should show a greater 
commitment to democracy and reform before increasing its engagement (De 
Waal, 2010) 
 
The ideals behind the Rose Revolution were soon further compromised, with 
Robakidze (2011) arguing that much of the ‘media freedom’ touted by 
President Saakashvili was simply rhetoric designed to boost his association 
with US and EU. The post-Soviet media legacy has been problematic in 
Georgia, with state interventions, unclear ownership – and perhaps most 
importantly difficult access to public information and broadcast licenses. 
Saakashvili initially successfully transformed the economy, targeting endemic 
corruption. Perhaps even more significantly, he travelled widely and courted 
the western media, winning positive profiled portraying Georgia as a 
democratic success story (De Waal 195).  
 
With the exception of the Baltic States, Georgia remains perhaps the pre-
eminent example of a pro-Western, post-Soviet State. However, Konstanyan 
and Tsertsvadze (2012) argue that, a decade after the Rose Revolution, 
Georgia is characterised by an overreliance on political personalities, as 
opposed to democratic institutions and ‘the personality credited with leading 
Georgia to the path of democracy may end up undermining the very process 
he once started’. This, they argue, is largely because the authorities have not 
encouraged political pluralism and the major TV companies are controlled by 
the ruling party and ‘clearly manipulated for political ends’. In this context, the 
‘relatively free’ virtual space, including blogs and social networks, form an 
increasingly critical check on the ruling regime’s power. 
 
Ukraine: An overview 
 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 was hailed by many within the country, 
and particularly in the West, as a decisive break with the past. The events 
generated a huge amount of international attention, and the prognosis was 
that the years of ‘virtual democracy’ had been left behind, replaced by an 
opportunity that would lead the country towards liberal democracy, prosperity 
and integration into the Euro-Atlantic alliances (Copsey, 2010). However, 
even at the time there was much scepticism, not least from a significant part 
of Ukrainian society, broadly located in the Russian-speaking east of the 
country, that did not support the aims of the Orange Revolution and claimed 
that the revolution was orchestrated by the US and EU. For Reid (1998) 
Ukraine exhibits a tenuous, equivocal sense of identity and this cultural and 
political East/West split remains crucial context behind much Ukrainian 
political debate.  
 Similarities with Georgia were discernible throughout the events of the 
Revolution and their aftermath, although those similarities were rarely 
highlighted internationally. Like Georgia, the protests revolved around 
dissatisfaction with post-Soviet democratic progress. And, like Georgia, 
Polese (2010) argues that the crucial factor in the Orange Revolution was the 
transformation of informal social networks into formalised civil society groups 
and NGOs that then mobilised popular support and public protest. So, 
whereas Ukraine has obvious similarities with Russia and Belarus in terms of 
its internal cultural identity and historical development, its recent political 
trajectory and in particular the role of the media and civil society in the run-up 
to the colour revolutions has clear parallels with Georgia. 
 
The millions of protestors involved in the Orange Revolution were seeking 
transparency and improved living standards, and their demands were 
subsequently difficult for the newly incumbent politicians to meet. As with the 
Saakashvili regime in Georgia, the post-revolution presidency of Victor 
Yushchenko enjoyed only a brief honeymoon period. ‘The weight of public 
expectations vested in the Yushchenko presidency in 2005 was so great that 
it is scant surprise that his administration proved a great disappointment. The 
Orange ‘Revolution’ essentially replaced one part of the Ukrainian post-Soviet 
elite with another.’ (Copsey, 2010) 
 
The election campaign of 2005, and many events in Ukrainian politics since 
then, are often interpreted in both the West and Russia in foreign policy terms: 
broadly, whether Ukraine leans towards Russia or EU/NATO. This is further 
characterised as an electoral, cultural and linguistic divide between a 
Russian-speaking East exemplified by industrial cities like Donetsk and 
Kharkov, and a Ukrainian-speaking, Europe-facing west exemplified by Lviv. 
In fact, however, many argue that this characterisation is unhelpfully 
reductive, and masks the fact that politics in Ukraine, as elsewhere, is 
generally concerned with more fundamental economic issues and often 
localised in tone. 
 
By 2012, however, this characterisation was being pursued as vigorously as 
ever by the Western press, in the run-up to the European football 
championships jointly hosted by Ukraine and Poland. President Yanukovych’s 
‘counterproductive’ persecution of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko (jailed by the Yanukovych regime in 2011) was repeatedly 
highlighted by the Western European press. The Economist (2012) argues 
that Yanokovych’s approach to politics is increasingly similar to the autocratic 
Belarus leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and reflects the political culture of the 
Russian-speaking Donbass region around Dontesk, in eastern Ukraine, which 
provides him with his powerbase. It concedes, however, that the Ukrainian 
press remains ‘vibrant’, despite Yanokovych’s ‘bullying’ of the media. 
 
Both Ukraine and Georgia are classified as ‘semi-free’ by global media 
watchdog Freedom House. Indeed, the contextual similarities between the 
two countries is illustrated by Georgia’s score of 55 and Ukraine’s score of 56 
in 2011 (for comparison: Iran 91, UK 19, US 17, Sweden 11). The scores are 
intended to reflect legal and political pressures on the media as well as 
economic factors constraining media freedom around the world. Ukraine in 
particular experienced a ‘significant decline’ in press freedom in 2010 and an 
international delegation of press freedom organisations expressed concerns 





The author travelled to Tbilisi (Georgia) in April 2011 and Kiev/Kharkov 
(Ukraine) in February 2012. The intention was to interview a representative 
group of journalists about these themes in order to undertake a comparative 
study of the two countries. Hanitzsch et al’s large-scale comparative study of 
journalist’s attitudes (2011) followed Hofstede (2001) by constructing 
‘matched samples’ that allow for comparison across countries because of 
their similar compositions. The volume of material processed by Hanitzsch et 
al’s large-scale study, and the number of countries involved in the 
comparison, necessitated such an approach. By contrast, this comparative 
study was deliberately restricted to two countries and involved a series of 
immersive, semi-structured interviews with journalists: all of whom were active 
political (print) journalists, and all of whom had some knowledge and 
experience of online journalism within the context of the countries in question. 
This latter requirement was intended to render the sample group relatively 
coherent and meaningful in terms of perspective and policy. For the purposes 
of the study, journalists were further defined as those who had some level of 
editorial responsibility. Within these criteria, an attempt was made to be as 
inclusive as possible and participants were selected according to hierarchy 
and, subsequently, willingness to participate (editors were approached first, 
followed by deputies, followed by chief reporters).  
 
A series of basic research tools were developed in advance of the interviews 
to ensure intercultural validity. The intention was to develop an outline 
conceptualisation of the fundamental issues addressing both the deficiencies 
of conventional journalism and the related potential for online journalism in 
order to formulate four simply worded, leading questions for discussion that 
could be meaningfully applied in both national contexts. The simple wording 
was deliberate and necessary for comparative purposes, and this semi-
structured approach was intended, in particular, to allow participants to define 
the role of online media within their respective journalistic environments, 
rather than the researcher. The four questions were posed to all participants, 
with subsequent discussion adapted to fit the specificities of each country, 
particularly when exploring the significance of recent political developments 
(for instance, the 2011 arrest of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in 
Ukraine and the recent calls for autonomy among the Armenian minority in 
one region of Georgia). Ideally more immersive interviews would have been 
conducted, but time and resources prevented this. In Tbilisi, circumstances 
meant that five of the journalists were interviewed as a panel, alongside 
subsequent immersive interviews with three individual Georgian journalists. In 
Ukraine, all seven interviews were with individual journalists in separate 
locations. 
 
With the exception of two journalists in Tbilisi, for whom I obtained the 
services of a translator, all those questioned spoke English. Clearly, this is not 
ideal as the sample immediately becomes artificially selective. However, the 
comparative nature of the study, in two distinctive linguistic environments, 
made it essential. Further, the web-based focus of the study tended to mean 
that those journalists approached to participate, in both Ukraine and Georgia, 
were young (all under 40, most under 30) and therefore far more likely to 
speak English than older journalists trained under the Soviet system (who 
tend to speak Russian as a second language: the tendency to use Russian as 
a lingua franca is diminishing in Georgia, hence the need for a comparative 
study to be conducted in English). The post-Soviet context is equally crucial: 
all those interviewed received journalistic training after the Soviet era. 
 
Most of the participants in both Georgia and Ukraine requested anonymity, 
and while some allowed their full names to be quoted in the study, it was felt 
to be more prudent to anonymise all interviewees by using forenames only for 
identification purposes. This was made clear to all participants before the 
interviews began. One journalist in Ukraine requested full anonymity: this is 
made clear in the text. 
 
The following research questions were posed to all participants in each 
country: 
 
1.What are the barriers to conventional journalism? 
2. What is the relationship between the online press, mainstream press and 
politics? 
2b. Are there any genuinely influential online political websites? 
3. How are minorities covered in the media?  
3b. What role does online journalism have in the portrayal of minority linguistic 
and ethnic groups? 
 
The intention was for the interviews to follow a logical discursive progression: 
Question (1) was intended to gain the participants perspectives on what they 
saw to be the deficiencies of the mainstream media in their respective 
countries, followed by (2), an open question on the role and impact of online 
political journalism. A follow-up question on influential websites (2b) was 
asked only if the participant specifically mentioned a website after question 
two, and is absorbed into that section in the analysis below. Finally (3), the 
coverage of, and representation of minorities within each country was 
included as a ‘litmus test’ for many related issues of media freedom and 
democracy. Again, where relevant in the subsequent discussion this was 
expanded on in a further question (3b), which asked participants to consider 
the current and potential role of online journalism in the representation and 
coverage of minority ethnic and linguistic communities. Ahmed (2012) argues 
that the inability of countries to either incorporate minority groups into a liberal 
and tolerant society or resolve what he calls the ‘centre versus periphery’ 
conflict is emblematic of a systemic failure of the modern state.   
 
Evidence from sociological research suggests that the processes involved in 
interpreting a question and formulating an answer are complex. For example, 
if the researcher re-words questions, responses from participants tend to 
change. If the interviewer provides even slightly amended response options 
then people will give different answers (Clarke and Schober, 1992). This is an 
inevitable result of human interaction, although attempts can be made to 
standardise the process as much as possible and therefore minimise possible 
bias or variation between the groups, and individual participants. The author 
made an attempt to standardise the three leading questions, as the immersive 
nature of individual interviews allowed for this, in order to avoid potential 
sources of bias that inevitably arise when questions are reworded. This was 
particularly important in terms of the validity of this study: as questions were 
posed to individual journalists in two very different cultural environments. 
Instead, discussion was allowed to progress after the standardised leading 
questions with a small amount of country-specific prompting from the author. 
However, this does not, of course, lead to standardisation of ‘meaning’ from 
the perspective of the participants. Instead, understanding is often affected by 
a range of social and cultural factors, and this is clearly particularly relevant 
when conducting a comparative study in two countries. As previously stated, 
the author attempted to overcome some of these issues by ensuring that all 
participants were drawn from similar journalistic backgrounds. 
 
However, undertaking work that assesses the real impact of online political 
journalism is unavoidably problematic when working as an individual 
researcher. Focusing on a single theme and striving for a level of social 
coherence among the groups helps, but ultimately the validity of studies such 
as this is inevitably compromised by scale. That said, it is also apparent that 
immersive interviews lend themselves to more natural conversation and thus 
produce some interesting, often revealing responses. While inferences and 
real meaning in this context remain problematic for the researcher, individual 
interviews allow for in-depth probing and exploration of the meaning the 
respondent intends to convey with their reply, a crucial part of the interviewing 
process (Suchman and Jordan, 1992). The author attempted to engage in 
some prompting of this sort, as this interactional technique to clarify meaning 
is almost unavoidable during human contact, with the process intended to 
mimic the process of natural conversation where attempts are usually made to 
establish the speakers real intended meaning, or check that their own 
message has been properly understood. The issue of meaning is obviously 
central to understanding subjective views like this, hence the vital importance 
of assessing interviewees understanding of questions. However, too much 
prompting would have been inappropriate given the scale and scope of the 
focus groups. This unobtrusive, relatively minimal approach to prompting was 
intended to avoid altering the interview dynamic and meant that much of the 
exploration of the meaning of the responses was conducted during analysis of 
the data rather than in collaboration with the interviewees.  
 
A degree of prompting is inevitable, however, and can be further rationalised 
by the fact that participants sometimes have to make suppositions to answer 
questions. Evidence from cognitive research suggests that many people will 
respond even if they do not understand the question (Clarke and Schober, 
1992), and therefore inconsistencies in response should alert the interviewer 
to comprehension problems. One of the obvious further weaknesses with this 
kind of research, first highlighted by the work of Morley (1980), is the reliance 
on what respondents choose to disclose, and, crucially for this study, what 
they are able to articulate about the democratizing potential of online 
journalism. There is also evidence that people strive to be consistent when 
they answer questions and might choose logically consistent responses even 
if this does not reflect their views (Clarke and Schober, 1992).  
 
Evidential chapter: Interviews 
 
1: What are the barriers to conventional journalism? 
 
All interviewees in both countries were initially asked an open-ended question 
about what they see as the main barriers to conventional, mainstream 
journalism in their respective countries. There was a notable degree of 
commonality in the immediate responses, with the majority of interviewees 
focusing on financial constraints, together with issues of objectivity which 
revolved around what most (but not all) participants described as ‘self-
censorship’. The Georgian respondents also stressed criticisms of recent 
government actions towards the news media, emphasising what they saw as 
the damage caused by political developments. Responses are merged in 
order to provide a more meaningful comparison between the two countries. 
 
Nino R, Georgia: ‘Together with the problem of public information 
accessibility, the independent press and online media outlets are facing a 
serious financial crisis in Georgia…that’s the first thing we should say. The 
most obvious effect of this is that media organisations trying to provide the 
public with balanced news are often less attractive for advertisers…who 
generally steer clear of advertising in the kind of online or print publications 
that publish investigative articles or offer readers, er, what we might call 
critical analysis of government reforms.’ 
 
Katerina, Georgia: ‘Things have got a bit worse recently, but actually, 
the…signs were there quite early. Changes happened quickly after the Rose 
Revolution, you know. Just a month after Saakashvili came to power, popular 
TV stations shut down one after another. The Georgian media just has not 
been able to play the role expected of it since the Rose Revolution.  The best 
journalists obviously refuse to simply transmit official statements, so they tend 
to work in the independent media. But this means their work gets a small 
audience.’ 
 
Broadcast information is often misleading, unbalanced and partisan in 
Georgia, with the 2011 Media Sustainability Index report noting that ‘Political 
bias often comes not in the form of Western-style, value-based leanings, but 
rather outright propaganda and counter-propaganda’. This is despite 
guarantees for free speech being enshrined in the Georgian constitution 
immediately after the Rose Revolution in 2004, which provides clear principles 
to safeguard against the abuse of restrictions on freedom of speech (Yerevan 
Press Club, 2012). 
 
Nino M, Georgia: ‘It’s true enough to say that media legislation in Georgia 
often seems near-perfect, certainly surprisingly liberal. But media company 
owners will tell you it all helps the government to implement, um, what we 
might call…indirect but obvious pressure on journalists. There is almost no 
transparency in terms of media ownership and this is a huge problem. 
Georgians don’t know who is delivering the news to them.’ 
 
Salome, Georgia: ‘Rustavi 2 [TV Channel] really just represents the 
Saakashvili government, with Imedi TV a bit more independent. Saakashvili 
knows the power of the media, he keeps an eye on the media, there’s no 
question….’  
 
Direct censorship has been alleged, and there are also concerns about the 
representation of minority linguistic and ethnic groups. The media, and NGOs 
in general, have become particular targets for the Saakashvili regime: “The 
sometimes course methods to accomplish reforms, the weak opposition in 
parliament, and the identification of president Saakashvili with an enlightened 
autocratic leaders such as Kemel Ataturk justify the paradoxical expression 
that under Shevardnaze, Georgia was a hybrid democracy without democrats, 
whereas under Saakashvili, Georgia was led by a democratic ideal of image, 
without being a democracy” (Companjen, 2010: 27). 
 
The Ukrainian response to the question was notably similar, but some 
participants took the opportunity to relate media deficiency with wider cultural 
changes in the country. 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: ‘Soviet people, if we can call them that, had a culture of 
reading newspapers, and indeed reading generally. In fact the entire 
education system, was, I would say, built around people reading papers and 
books. That culture of reading through traditional media is vanishing. This is 
partly explained, in my view, by the lack of colour. I, er…think I mean that in 
two ways. Newspapers in Ukraine are dull, they cover dull topics, and they are 
literally dull…I mean, they’re in black and white! Magazines, of the gossip 
variety, yellow journalism, whatever you want to call it, expanded in the last 
decade because they were in colour. For lots of people, worrying numbers of 
people, they have replaced news, politics, discussion. You know, only one or 
two newspapers are now seen in Kiev – and what’s very worrying is that 
there’s a big middle to lower income older audience that lacks web access.” 
 
Participants in both countries referred to self-censorship as a major, and 
continuing problem, although the Ukrainian journalists were more likely to 
stress the issue than those in Georgia. 
 
Tetyana, Ukraine: ‘There is self censorship, certainly, we censor ourselves… 
as journalists, I mean, we censor ourselves. How will what I write be 
received? It’s not like the days of Kuchma with direct censorship but rather, 
still, a question of self censorship. Let me be clear: self-censorship has 
definitely gone up since Yanukovych [came to power]. After the orange 
revolution, there was a feeling of freedom, but now this form of censorship 
has returned. It’s not the same as before the orange revolution but it’s 
definitely increasing. ‘ 
 
One of the interviewees in Kiev took a particularly negative view of the 
country’s journalism and political system: this participant requested full 
anonymity. Again, he responded to the first question by mentioning self-
censorship, but immediately introduced a different take on the issue. 
 
M, Ukraine: ‘You hear a lot of political activists and independent-minded 
journalists talking about the problems of self censorship but, look, in my view 
self censorship is too soft a term for what goes on here. They do this, censor 
themselves, because otherwise they’d be fired. It’s that simple. I was 
speaking to a local journalist in Kiev recently who said that everyone, or all the 
troublemakers at least, have been fired on his paper.  
 
‘I’ll give you an example of what I mean by this. On my paper we tried to run a 
particular story that got us into trouble, but the journalists on other papers I 
spoke to just couldn’t understand it. They said: why didn’t you just pull the 
story? They just didn’t get it. People still want state jobs here – it’s the biggest 
evidence the system just isn’t working. Ukrainian journalists come to our 
paper and say “I can’t imagine writing this without being fired”. Journalists 
don’t know how to be journalists here, they don’t know what a good lead is, 
they often can’t write.’ 
 
In the media sphere in many post-communist contexts, the so-called Anglo-
American model of journalism has been widely accepted as a norm of 
professional attitude and quality journalism, even though it is in part a myth 
(e.g. Hallin and Mancini, 2004), and even though concepts of journalistic 
performance are strongly influenced by journalistic traditions in different 
countries (Jakubowicz, 2001).  The views of ‘M’ above, chime with this latter 
viewpoint, with his suggestion that mainstream media deficiencies are 
systemic and cultural, rather than merely structural or economic, in their 
origin.  
 
Over a decade ago, Splichal (2001) argued that although the media in post-
socialist states have made significant gains in terms of liberalisation and 
pluralisation, they ‘remain vulnerable to manipulation by political forces and, in 
addition, became dependent on commercial corporations’. While countries like 
Bulgaria and Romania have made considerable progress in this respect, 
partially necessitated by membership of the EU, the post-Soviet journalistic 
environment in the former USSR remains compromised by older traditions 
echoing Soviet practices. 
 
M, Ukraine: ‘If you wanted to launch a successful newspapers in Ukraine it 
would be easy – you’d write about corruption, politicians taking bribes, you 
know…all that stuff. No politicians have a real vision for the country, they all 
just want power, and that’s the explanation for what I see as the false east-
west split conjured up by politicians and the press [this refers to the cultural 
‘divide’ between Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine and Ukrainian-speaking, 
Europe-facing West, and is covered in more depth in section 3]. There’s no 
positive vision for the country, in other words.’ 
 
‘Look, the east-west split is not a problem. What people want is to see people 
attacking the corrupt but you won’t see that in any newspaper because 
nobody would fund it. Ukrainska Pravda is the one paper to do this. It’s only 
online, and it has Danish sponsors I think. These guys are very good, they do 
proper investigative journalism, you know what I mean. Part of the problem is 
that there is zero trust of newspapers. Mainstream journalism here is used to 
taking money for articles. Proper journalism is not mainstream, it’s niche, it’s 
online.” 
 
Notably, this participant independently raised the online ‘solution’ to 
deficiencies in the mainstream, without prompting by the author and before 
the question that was intended to address the issue specifically. Other 
Ukrainian participants held similar, though somewhat less critical, views on 
the issue of mainstream journalistic deficiencies. 
 
Tetyana, Ukraine: “With Yanokovych [Victor Yanukovych, President since 
narrowly defeating Tymoshenko in January 2010] all the good progress 
seemed to go back the other way. If you do an interview, er, you have to send 
the article over for inspection, and people…journalists, do this naturally. Also, 
I should say, the systems of paper distribution are terrible” 
 Ukraine and Georgia both profess allegiance to ‘western’ concepts of free 
press as it relates to democracy, and both have EU membership as a long-
term policy objective. However, in all three there are tensions with regard to 
control of the mainstream press. Notably, incidents of censorship and other 
forms of state control over the news media have increased sharply since the 
events of the ‘Arab Spring’. Indeed, the idealistic elements of the Arab Spring 
were echoed by opposition protests in both countries during 2011. These 
protests were relatively small scale and generated little global news coverage 
but many had significant consequences. In Georgia, for example, protests in 
2011 relating to media freedom and other issues resulted in the arrests and 
imprisonment of numerous high profile journalists (this claim was related 
independently by three of the Georgian interviewees). 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: “People who are emotionally driven are willing to spend extra 
time working on stories about politics – this is precisely the reason that 
independent websites like Ukrainska Pravda are thriving, along with some 
notable blogs. Fewer professional journalists see their, ah, working place as a 
space for creativity because they’re limited by low salaries and what I would 
call forms of, well, censorship. Political censorship is often mixed up with 
editorial policy that derives from owners who are often politicians interested in 
media assets. This is not necessarily the same as direct censorship. I’ll give 
you the example of Sevodnya, which is controlled by a Donetsk tycoon, who, 
er, fired the editor after he carried a…controversial story and appointed a new 
manager who was, erm, loyal to the government but a failure professionally. 
This was a scandal! Its complicated: on the one hand there’s growing 
censorship as shown by this case, on the other hand editors try to follow their 
investors and not harm their interests.“ 
 
Other participants cited more fundamental structural problems, suggesting 
that the future of the mainstream press was fatally compromised by a 
combination of technology, global recession, and, perhaps more importantly, 
a widespread lack of trust in the media. Maksym chose to illustrate this with 
the same example of malpractice.  
 Maksym, Ukraine: ‘Print journalism is dying very fast in Ukraine. Two years 
ago I would see a lot of people reading newspapers, on the metro, on buses, 
but two weeks ago I realised I hasn’t seen anyone reading a paper for 
months. Hundreds of small papers in Ukraine are supported by local 
authorities, and they are struggling with funds. The 2008 recession more or 
less destroyed the print business in Ukraine. Also, people just don’t believe 
newspapers – the level of journalism…the, erm…quality, is low. The popular 
sites cover everything but they do it in a tabloid style. Here’s an example from 
Sevodnya, owned by the richest man in Ukraine. A journalist wrote an article 
about the president’s house…soon after that article they had problems and, 
erm, the editor was fired. So now they avoid news about politicians.’ 
 
2. What is the relationship between the online press, mainstream press 
and politics? A follow-up question, which asked interviewees to name 
particularly influential websites, was also posed where relevant, and absorbed 
in the results and analysis below: 
2b. Are there any genuinely influential online political websites? 
 
The follow-up question was intended to draw out participants’ views on what 
they saw as particularly influential political websites, although some had 
already raised the issue by referring (in both countries) to one particularly 
influential independent site. Clearly, the subtext – not directly articulated by 
the interviewer – was linked to the first question about barriers to conventional 
journalism in Georgia and Ukraine. Could any of these websites offer a 
‘solution’ to the mainstream deficiencies outlined above? The responses to 
this question were perhaps the most notable, in the sense that every 
participant highlighted the existence of an independent ‘hub’ news website 
seen as most influential. Every Ukrainian journalist, without exception, 
mentioned Ukrainska Pravda as the most notable online journal and several 
participants cited the website as the only exception to the rather dismal 
picture of Ukrainian journalism outlined in the first section above. Similarly, 
every Georgian journalist independently mentioned the Netgazeti website, 
again highlighting its independent, trusted status (Liberali, a similar Georgian 
site, was also frequently cited). This response related to the overarching 
second question about the relationship between online journalism and the 
mainstream press, although most participants began by outlining access 
issues in the context of online journalism. The Georgians were slightly more 
likely to stress future potential rather than current activity. 
 
Nino R, Georgia: “This coming year will be very important, I think, in terms of 
increasing online readership. Until last year there was a big war between rival 
internet providers [in Georgia] and now that war has been, ah…handled by 
the government and now all are aiming at the regions and spreading out from 
just covering Tbilisi. We were working on a story about this recently, and we 
found out that all the regions will be covered by the end of this year and it, 
it…won’t be as expensive as it was a year or two ago so it will, you know, 
probably very soon become a serious alternative to many other kinds of 
news.”  
 
Many former Soviet countries have shown signs of using new media 
technologies as a ‘solution’ to the problems inherent in their existing 
mainstream news media environments. These trends are arguably clearest in 
‘west-facing’ post-Soviet environments like Ukraine and Georgia, but 
Hanitzsch (2011) et al argue that the values of objectivity and impartiality have 
spread away from the ‘global north’ in more general terms, and that there are 
now often great similarities in role conceptions among journalists globally, 
although considerable differences in journalistic practices remain. This, they 
say, is especially true for the perceived importance of analysis, partisanship, 
entertainment and critical attitude towards the powerful. In both countries, 
responses suggested that this change in ‘role conception’ was expressing 
itself most clearly online. In other words conventional media, newspapers in 
particular, were regarded by the participants as irrelevant and hopelessly 
dated, with a dwindling readership.  
 
Nana, Georgia: ‘It’s true that there’s quite a bit of optimism around about the 
potential of web journalism in Georgia but I should also add that one of the big 
problems is low levels of access in the ‘regions’ [areas outside Tbilisi]. At the 
moment it is only around 13-14%. This will go up this year, for sure.” 
 
In Ukraine, there is also a significant rural/urban split, with often very high 
levels of web access in Kiev. However, Ukraine’s geography means that it has 
highly significant provincial cites like Donetsk, Kharkov and Lviv, which all 
enjoy similarly high levels of web access. There is no equivalent to this in 
Georgia, which is dominated culturally and politically by Tbilisi, and has no 
large provincial cities.  
 
Maksym, Ukraine: ‘There’s no doubt that we have high levels of web access 
in Ukraine, around 50% in cities, maybe up to 60% in Kiev. A site like 
Ukrainska Pravda gets 200,000 daily visitors, which sounds impressive until 
you realise it’s maybe 1.5% of the entire Ukrainian web audience, so it’s not 
popular to use the web as a source of news’. 
 
Nino, Georgia: ‘Websites like Liberali and Netgazeti make a real attempt to 
provide balanced news. They’re not popular with advertisers, and that’s a real 
problem because they have to rely on meagre grants from NGOs. It’s only a 
small number of Georgians who are using the internet to view political 
information so this is not going to be big business.’ 
 
However, limited access is only a partial indicator of political influence. 
Indeed, the work of Megenta (2011) and Geniets (2011) suggests that the 
impact of the web should not be predicted by the number of people who use 
it. In contexts where online media remains the preserve of the educated 
middle class this can allow for the development of democratic social practices 
and information discourse online by reducing government control of 
information and enhancing political participation. Megenta (2011) explores the 
ways that online participatory media is chipping away at the power of overtly 
authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, arguing that the 
democratisation of elite groups in authoritarian contexts can trigger wider 
social and political changes. Equally significantly, early adopters of the 
technology often set its future direction: for Megenta, they have an 
interpretative role in the evolution of that media technology. In Tunisia, for 
example, well before the events of the Arab Spring the earliest users of web-
based media were often liberals with anti-authoritarian views: it becomes, 
therefore, a subversive medium.  
 
In Ukraine and Georgia, despite very different economic and cultural contexts, 
a similar pattern emerges. Anti-government protests in Georgia during 2011 
were covered at length on the Netgazeti site, and Ukrainska Pravda is well-
known for its independent stance and scepticism towards political elites. 
Coverage on both sites often contrasts with the silence of the mainstream 
press: there is, in other words, an increasing tendency for these online ‘hub’ 
websites to simply sidestep the mainstream press. There is no ‘source cycle’, 
merely a coalescing of interested and engaged readers around trusted online 
sources. 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: “There’s definitely a correlation between the overall political 
situation in Ukraine and the audience’s interest in web-based news. There is a 
zeitgeist. Google summaries prove this. Most users are just interested in, er, 
you know…celebrity news and gossip but at number 10 in the list of search 
terms in Ukraine is still Tymoshenko [jailed former Prime Minister], even 
though the issue has gone away from the mainstream. Maybe 10% of 
Ukrainian web users are engaged in political issues most of the time.” 
 
Geniets (2011) considers the specifics of this access argument, which is 
frequently cited by those cynical about the democratising potential of new 
media. She argues we are witnessing the rise of a global elite and in many 
countries ‘cosmopolitans do not consume the same information about the 
world as their fellow citizens’ (Geniets, 2011: 74). Similarly, Megenta (2011) 
argues that although overtly authoritarian regimes like that of Ethiopia censor 
the web, its cyberspace is highly subversive because those who have access 
are generally anti-government. In the context of Ukraine and Georgia a small 
number of influential blogs have the majority of inward links, giving early 
adopters enormous power to further interpret and reinterpret journalistic use 
of the web. 
 Maksym, Ukraine: ‘Online websites are in very interesting position. Any bad 
news about the Ukrainian authorities is very popular, er, news spreads fast. 
And it is going local, or maybe even hyperlocal. There are two or three local 
news sites at present but I think the future will be local. Ukrainian online 
journalism is mainly copycat journalism apart from Ukrainska Pravda, 
whereas local news can generate real news and interest.’  
 
Megenta (2011) notes that the relationship between bloggers and the 
mainstream media in African authoritarian countries is much less fractious, 
both rhetorically and in practice, than in the West. Bloggers both directly and 
indirectly influence the agenda of mainstream media outlets and they also 
function as agenda-testing grounds for journalists.  Roberts (2011) argues 
that, in some deficient media contexts, distinctive small-scale ‘source cycles’ 
are emerging, which implicitly recognise the failure of the traditional 
mainstream press and set about developing an alternative.  This recognition 
of deficiency, and the deliberate attempt to address it, is crucial. Indeed, Atton 
and Hamilton (2011) define the concept of ‘alternative journalism’ as being 
informed by a critique of existing ways of doing journalism. It proceeds both 
from dissatisfaction with the mainstream coverage of topics but also with the 
epistemology of news, emphasizing, for instance, alternative sourcing routines 
and the subordinate role of audience as receiver. 
 
Such an approach means that online journalism finds itself able to set a wider 
media agenda, with far-reaching implications. Messner and DiStasto (2008) 
argue that newspapers are increasingly legitimizing blogs as credible sources, 
identifying a mutually beneficial ‘source cycle’ between the two in their US-
based research. In this model, blogs rely heavily on traditional media as 
sources, while the mainstream press is increasingly inclined to legitimize 
blogs as credible sources of information, particularly in the political realm. As 
it applies to US journalism, it is perhaps inevitable that this model suggests 
that, although blogs can ‘create a buzz’ around issues, this only reaches a 
limited public until it is then re-sourced by the traditional media.  
 
In smaller scale and/or structurally deficient media environments, like Ukraine 
and Georgia, these relationships are less skewed in favour of the mainstream 
press. Indeed, until the Arab Spring, a somewhat parochial anglocentrism 
characterized debate about the democratizing potential of new media, which 
had the inevitable effect of underestimating that potential. Even in the post-
Arab Spring context, this parochialism means that interpretations of the role of 
new media tend to be unhelpfully narrow in scope. Comparative approaches 
argue, in contrast, that the most valid and substantive way to assess the 
impact and reach of political blogs is to consider their relationship with the 
mainstream news agenda. This paper contends that smaller scale media 
contexts offer some unique opportunities for online journalism to gain traction 
by impacting on, and enriching, the wider public sphere. Reese, Rutigliano, 
Hyun and Jeong (2009) argue that the impact of blogs is enhanced by 
anchoring their discussions to the stream of information, opinion and analysis 
produced by traditional media. Similarly, Drezner and Farrell (2004) argue that 
if a critical number of high-profile blogs raise a particular story, it can attract 
the interest of mainstream media outlets. If the mainstream media therefore 
address and frame critical issues, which political actors feel obliged to 
address, independent online journalism can perhaps construct focal points 
through which the mainstream media choose to operate. A significant critical 
mass needs to develop around blogs of this kind if they are to succeed in 
attracting the attention of the mainstream media, however. The obvious 
corollary to this is: to what extent can participatory media drive civic 
engagement? The figures are not encouraging but, as Megenta argues, such 
active participants are always likely to be in the minority. What matters is for 
new and diverse voices to join the debate and help provide a catalyst for 
others. 
 
Ruslan, Ukraine: ‘When the Tymoshenko issue happened there was some 
discussion on TV but all that is censored so people double check information 
online. I think they…more rely on the web. They trust it more because there’s 
a variety of opinions, um…there’s always people for and against. People are a 
little bit tired of the way TV reports because often they show one-sided 
arguments. Even people who are not active, who say they’re not interested, 
suddenly get interested in something like the Tymoshenko case. People get 
clips from the web, you know…they, er, find things out. Web users ridiculed 
Yanukovych when a wreath blew into his face during a sombre ceremony. 
The creativity of users brings irony into political discussion and this, um, is an 
important…a vital point. I believe that it’s humour that makes the web 
powerful in Ukraine, because with TV and the press satire is just not a 
developed genre here. Satirical creativity…that’s what I mean and the, er, 
web lets people communicate with each other. They’re not under time 
pressure…they don’t have particular objectives, unlike professionals.’ 
 
The importance of political satire in the ‘new’ context of online journalism, and 
its potential to engage the audience was further developed by another 
Ukrainian participant. 
 
Yevhen, Ukraine: ‘Satire has hugely contributed to the success of online in 
Ukraine. Social media is full of satirical treatments. It’s just a pity that some 
people who don’t use social media are cut out of the loop. You must have 
heard of the mobile phone footage of the Yanokovych ‘wreath incident’ [the 
wind blew a ceremonial wreath towards the Prime Minister’s face at a 
commemorative service]. In half an hour it went viral despite his attempts to 
‘manage the crisis’ by deleting footage. The PM is, I would say, dyslexic in 
terms of expressing his ideas and people have fun exploiting that online. 
Journalists in traditional media wouldn’t be able to do this. Here the 
government is not playing the same game as it is in Russia. Here they don’t 
understand how powerful the web is. Either you use it for its own sake or you 
try to control it.’  
 
In journalistic terms, the immediacy of interactive debate, the 'cultural terrain 
of cyberspace', has several distinct technology-derived advantages over the 
mainstream press. Not least of these is the potential to capture the features of 
dialogue more robustly than print and the potential to collapse spatial 
boundaries, as well as engaging readers via satire and other popular forms of 
journalism and reportage. While this may be a less notable benefit in the 
Anglosphere, in environments like Ukraine and Georgia web-based journalism 
allows for alternative perspectives to make a considerable impact and gain a 
considerable audience. Further to this, Lasica (2003) highlights the dynamism 
of web-based interactivity.  When journalism becomes a process, not a static 
product, audiences discard their traditional role as passive consumers of 
news and become empowered partners with a shared stake in the end result. 
Blogs are the most powerful and accessible current tool for user-generated 
content, and illustrate most clearly the changing nature of the relationship 
between producers and consumers of news. As Sambrook (2006) and others 
argue, the appeal of blogging as a counterpoint to mainstream reporting is 
readily apparent, especially when set against the current tendencies towards 
homogeneity and standardisation which increasingly characterise market-
driven journalism. 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: ‘New media is becoming our key priority – we teach journalists 
how to use new media technologies. New voices are being raised in Ukraine, 
who also know that the web may bring profits. It’s true that for many new 
media is just a hobby but they want to be professionals. I, er, think I’d go so 
far as to say we have a developing community of media innovators. Their 
motivation isn’t primarily to report independently but rather, um, a chance to 
work as journalists. They may be critical and will share information that shows 
government weakness. Bear in mind too that web access here is a lot 
cheaper here than it is in the Baltic states, say. Access is easy to obtain. 
Critical mass has already been reached among young but it’s also high with 
the middle aged.’ 
 
Yevhen, Ukraine: ‘More and more people consider online news their main 
source of media, you know, we didn’t have an enormous culture of print 
media, so a…niche was open. In the vacuum of independent Ukraine no 
quality newspapers emerged. We only had local newspapers or tabloid style 
newspapers. Magazines are a huge market, yes, but it was, er, new media 
that really filled the gap.’ 
 
Nino R, Georgia: ‘ I’d have to say that, already in certain communities online 
news is the only news they have.  Someone already mentioned minorities, 
well that is a good example – although of course these people are often 
accessing websites from outside Georgia. I don’t know the numbers but many 
people just don’t watch TV, especially the news, and they don’t read 
newspapers…but they are very informed. Social networks like Facebook are 
definitely being used to, erm, counteract problems in mainstream press. And I 
think we are using these sites more and more for social reasons than private. 
People choose friends based on who has the most and best information, who 
are the news givers.’ 
 
Nana, Georgia: “I think in terms of online journalism this year is also important 
for a second reason, which is a big US aid grant to assist Georgian media. 
They have a huge emphasis, a huge aim, to assist online new media 
development so there will be some big scale grants given to local and regional 
media outlets to develop online media channels. So I think this will change the 
media landscape here.” 
 
The participants all had a tendency to swap terms when referring to the 
democratizing potential of online journalism. This is significant as there is a 
considerable, and growing, issue regarding the definition of terms in the area 
of new media and online journalism. In particular, when attempting to make an 
assessment of the potential for online journalism to promote meaningful 
political change, precise definitions are of fundamental importance.  Lievrouw 
(2011) argues that ‘new media’ has become something of a cultural 
‘placeholder’. People often use it without having a clear idea of what it means, 
partly because the boundaries of new media are often uncertain. More 
recently, the use of social media and other online forms during the Arab 
Spring encapsulated the importance of the ‘network’ as a means of countering 
the traditional dominance of political elites in environments where those elites 
see the media as something to be ‘controlled’. As such, much of this sort of 
online journalism could be considered alternative or activist. 
 
David, Georgia: “We all use Facebook to discuss issues and ideas. There are 
over 600,000 users in Georgia. Interestingly our neighbours Armenia tried to 
mirror the Arab Spring and organize some kind of Facebook Revolution. It 
didn’t really work but it says something about the potential for online activism 
of this kind in the [Caucasus] region. Look, when the mainstream can’t 
provide you with reliable or meaningful information you search for 
substitutions. There is a need for different perspectives.’ 
 
Lievrouw (2011) attempts to define alternative and activist new media as 
employing or modifying the communication practices and social arrangements 
of new information technologies to challenge or alter dominant, accepted 
ways of reporting and engaging in society, culture and politics. The networked 
nature of new media allows creators, via the ubiquity and interactivity it offers 
users, to create projects in which people share information, extend networks 
and contacts, and critique or intervene in prevailing social, cultural, economic 
and political conditions. New media of this kind does not only reflect or critique 
mainstream media and culture, they constitute and intervene in them. Much of 
this echoes the more recent views of Mason who argues that the events of the 
Arab Spring demonstrate conclusively the power of the network and its ability 
to defeat or challenge political elites (Mason, 2012, Lievrow, 2011). 
 
Yevhen, Ukraine: ‘Last week a file service was closed down in Ukraine. 
Officially we were told this was because of piracy but next day 100,000 people 
organised to attack government websites and closed them down. This was all 
organised by social networks and publicised by Ukrainska Pravda. The 
government were paralysed in web terms but they were particularly upset 
because they couldn’t control the situation…and they eventually reinstated the 
pirate service. But, you know what, it’s a pyrrhic victory for us, because the 
government may try to devote more effort now to control the web, more like 
they do in Russia. This could be really dangerous at some point in the near 
future and could bring tighter controls over the web in general.’ 
 
Ruslan, Ukraine: ‘Now, for all public campaigns the best way is to use social 
networks. We realise that if we’re united we can send a message to 
government. The Tymoshenko debate took place mostly online, and I’m not 
sure this was appreciated internationally. But Twitter is still a weak instrument 
here… Facebook is the number one place to consume news. And I should 
add that the Pravda news site helps coordinate it all, or at least publicises 
what’s going on, makes it…central.’ 
 
Participatory journalism such as that referenced by the interviewees seeks to 
critique and reform the press by involving ‘amateur’ reporters in the practice of 
journalism. It becomes an interactive process, adopts the forms of 
professional journalism but with the purpose of transforming the press as an 
institution. It provides new arenas for news opinion and analysis that is 
marginalised by the mainstream. Newman’s (2009) study of how UK and US 
mainstream media is responding to the wave of participatory social media and 
the historic shift in control towards individual consumers, argues that social 
media, blogs and user-generated content are not replacing journalism, but are 
creating an important extra layer of information and diverse opinion. Most 
people are still happy to rely on mainstream news organisations to sort fact 
from fiction and serve up a filtered view, but they are increasingly engaged by 
this information, particularly when recommended by friends or another trusted 
source. He concludes that there is a new confidence in the underlying values 
of journalism and the role that social media might play in keeping those values 
relevant in the digital age. 
 
However, it could again be argued that such conclusions are narrowly 
anglocentric in focus. This study, instead, suggests that in some dysfunctional 
media environments, where the mainstream media cannot or will not ‘serve up 
a filtered view’ of this interactivity and participation, there is a coalescing 
around what might be called ‘hub’ websites: independent political websites 
which deliberately position themselves as an alternative to mainstream 
journalism but do this via a rather traditional, objective approach: the kind of 
journalism fetishized as the Western ideal. We know that the net allows 
diverse groups to coordinate and organise protests in a very short time. But 
there are more significant political developments in Ukraine and Georgia, 
whereby a particular, professionally produced but independent site 
deliberately addresses mainstream deficiencies by providing a focal point for 
the discontented and a ‘filtered’, often edited, source of social media.  
 
Tetyana, Ukraine: ‘The recent tax protests in Kiev were interesting. It was the 
first genuine protest since the Orange Revolution in my view. Basically, small 
businesses were protesting over tax, just ordinary people. They, erm, debated 
the issues online then gathered in Maydan [Kiev’s main square]. In fact it 
spilled over from online to offline. Mainstream media was so reluctant to cover 
it that people had to go online to cover it…to read about it even. These aren’t 
people who know how to use Facebook and Twitter, they’re market traders. 
Instead they used simple online forums. The protests went on for a whole day 
before TV channels mentioned it. New media pushed the mainstream media 
to cover it. Someone took webcam footage and published it online. It was 
almost as if we all participated. Then even the international media covered it 
before the Ukrainian media. Our media was waiting, waiting to cover it. 
Suddenly you see a live community gathering online and, bang, we all know 
about it. No-one trusts the [mainstream] media so we look for comments from 
the, er…guy next door. There’s always the question whether these 
professional journalists have some kind of agenda. This is why Ukrainska 
Pravda is a key source of news and information. It collates this stuff, it’s 
reliable and it puts it all into some kind of journalistic focus.’ 
 
‘I follow bloggers who are not journalists. The big difference between Ukraine 
and Russia is that we don’t have blogging ‘faces’. There are so many 
bloggers, loads of bloggers, but no ‘faces’. I always come across new 
bloggers – they don’t have ties between them, no aggregation. It’s almost like 
we’re walking round in the dark and then you suddenly stumble across 
something. I think that’s a big reason for the success…the…value, of a more 
professional site like Ukrainska Pravda.’ 
 
This participant highlighted differences between Ukraine and Russia. The 
contextual presence of Russia is obviously critical when discussing Ukrainian 
and Georgian politics. Vladimir Putin has spent much time and energy 
attempting to recreate a sphere of influence in the Caucasus and parts of 
Eastern Europe. Although formally a democracy, Russia has well-documented 
strong authoritarian tendencies under his leadership (Garton Ash, 2004). 
However, Russia’s internet space, Runet is virtually free of censorship or 
government control and, unlike China, Russia has not created an internet 
framework it can easily control. Indeed, the BBC covered Russian opposition 
use of the LiveJournal blogging platform in March 2012 (BBC, 2012). The 
changing media landscape in Russia is crucial in explaining the growth of 
opposition sentiment in the country. Since 2007 the number of Russian 
Internet users has jumped from 23 to 53 million; more than 13 million use 
Facebook and the old media are now easily bypassed (The Week, 2012). 
Fossato and Lloyd (2008), however, argue that Russian online networks are 
often ‘closed and intolerant’ with web users unresponsive to political 
campaigning online. The context of Russia is crucial for Ukraine and Georgia, 
as elements in both countries frequently define themselves in opposition to it. 
This study suggests that ‘large-scale’ media environments like those of 
Russia, China and the ‘Anglosphere’ limit the impact of online political 
journalism, but that in other contexts and cultures, with smaller-scale media 
environments, web-based journalism remains a serious, and sometimes lone, 
challenge to the failings of the mainstream press. And, further, that ‘hub’ 
websites provide a focus for interested parties. That said, financing online 
political journalism of this nature is likely to remain a challenge. 
 
Katarina, Georgia: “The journal Liberali, especially the web version, and the 
purely online Netgazeti, are good examples of the kind of publication that 
advertisers stay away from in Georgia. They do this because of the 
content…it’s truthful, real journalism. But they struggle, you know, financially. 
The main source of income for both are grants provided by international 
NGOs for the development of independent media. Income from this is tiny 
though,’ 
 
3. How are minorities covered in the media? This question was again 
posed I some cases alongside a follow-up question, which was pursued 
where relevant: 
3b. What role does online journalism have in the portrayal of minority 
linguistic and ethnic groups? 
 
The final question revolved around a consideration of the representation of 
minority linguistic and ethnic groups within both countries. The post-Soviet 
context is crucial here. Nationalism was supposedly made redundant under 
the Soviet system, which was intended to be a free association of many 
different peoples with Communism fundamentally global in scope. The 
rationale for including this question was twofold: firstly, independence in the 
post-Soviet era rendered such ‘redundant’ issues pertinent and raised the 
question of how to negotiate the new paradigm in media terms. Further, it 
could be argued that the representation of minority groups acts as a kind of 
litmus test for a free press, in the sense that societies typically move from 
seeing internal minorities as a threat towards a celebration, or at least 
tolerance, of diversity. 
 
Clearly, the cultural contexts vary considerably here. Georgia is a classic 
Caucasian ‘melting pot’ of linguistic groups and ethnicities, whereas Ukraine 
is considerably more monoethnic. However, discussion was allowed to evolve 
with the obvious result that the debate among Ukrainian journalists revolved 
around the portrayal (and in some cases media-driven political exploitation) of 
the east-west split in the country, between a Europe-facing Ukrainian-
speaking West, and a Russian-speaking, Russian-facing East. All questions 
were underpinned by a consideration of the current and potential future role of 
online journalism in this area: both in terms of the representation of minority 
groups and in terms of hyperlocal news provision that represents and 
articulates their perspectives and concerns. 
 
Because of its ethnic and linguistic diversity, these issues are particularly 
pertinent in Georgia, where one of the key issues in terms of Georgian media 
freedom is the representation of minorities, which represent 16.2% of the 
population according to the Georgian Census of 2002 (Yerevan Press Club, 
2011). The largest minority communities are Azeri and Armenian, followed by 
Russians, Abkhazs, Assyrians, Greeks, Jews, Chechens, Kurds, Ossetians 
and Ukrainians. After the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government 
implemented several reforms aimed at promoting minority rights, yet there 
remain criticisms that the government has failed to manage pluralism 
constructively (Minority Rights Group International, 2009). Article 24(1) of the 
Georgian constitution guarantees the right to freely receive or impart 
information, but minority communities often face difficulties accessing 
information in the Georgian media because of the language barrier. The 
public broadcaster is legally bound ‘to reflect in its programmes ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, religious, age and gender diversity of the society and to 
broadcast programmes in minority languages in proportion’ according to 
Article 16 of Georgia’s Law of Broadcasting (2003). But while it does air some 
programmes, there is only (for instance) one weekly 20-minute news 
programme in Russian, and the range of print media in minority languages is 
even more limited. 
 
The Georgian journalists interviewed argued that there are few ethical 
standards when it comes to reporting of minorities.  
 
Sofia, Georgia: ‘I would have to say that coverage [of minorities] is either very 
limited in scope, or, quite often, focused on what you might call ‘criminal 
issues’. This might involve, er, emphasising a criminal’s ethnic or…even, 
er…linguistic group, in the coverage.’  
 
A survey by the NGO United Nations Association of Georgia found that the 
ethnicity of criminals or suspects is regularly emphasised when they are not of 
Georgian descent (Minority Rights Group International, 2009). Again, this runs 
counter to the Georgian broadcasting code. 
 
David, Georgia: “Here’s what I see as the big issue. If minorities have to rely 
on their own [foreign] news sources for information, political or otherwise, this 
is going to make them feel even more isolated within the Georgian state, 
surely?”  
 
However, despite these barriers, linguistic minorities in Georgia do use the 
media to develop and discuss political issues.  
 
Nino M, Georgia: ‘From time to time, they start up their own newspapers. 
Russians, for example. But their readership is very low…they are, erm, they’re 
just not encouraged to develop them. There isn’t a lot of demand for having a 
separate (Russian) media as there are still those…associations with Soviet 
days, but at the same time there are also programmes broadcast in local 
minority languages. The public broadcaster has some responsibility in this 
area and does broadcast occasional programmes in Armenian, for example, 
but commercial channels don’t even consider it.’ 
 
David, Georgia: ‘Also the big problem you can see in every field is the lack of, 
erm, self-governance. For example in regions where Azeri speakers dominate 
they would, or…should attempt to have their own media, to organise 
themselves to have something of their own, something that, um, speaks to 
them…but this almost never happens because of social, economic issues. 
There’s just not enough money for it and most people don’t have the 
information how to…how to do it. There’s an obvious role for the web here I 
think. It would be cheaper and easier to get something web-based off the 
ground but access rates are very low at the moment. In these regions many 
people haven’t got web access.’ 
 
The range of Georgian print media available in minority languages is very 
limited. Although there is little community private funding available, however, 
there is some governmental financial support provided to Vrastan, an 
Armenian language newspaper, and Svobodnia Gruzia, a Russian language 
newspaper. However, the latter title focuses largely on entertainment at the 
expense of politics (Minority Rights Group International, 2009). 
 
Nino R, Georgia: ‘The government doesn’t encourage it either because there 
is always a threat from ethnic TV because of problems of integration. For 
example, in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, in area populated mostly by 
Armenians it’s a very, very touchy issue. After the August 2008 war, this 
region was almost painted by the Georgian media as the next separatist 
region of Georgia, with Armenians depicted as Russia’s natural allies. They 
tried to organise the people along language lines and it’s a very aggressive 
campaign. For example they have, erm…numbers…quotas in higher 
education for Georgian-speakers who come from Samtskhe-Javakheti. There 
are two problems: a lack of self governance and a lack of encouragement 
from the government to strengthen ethnic minority language and culture within 
the country.’ 
 
There are localized solution to some of these issues, and there have been 
attempts to use hyperlocal news media, some of it web-based, to articulate 
the concerns and perspectives of minority ethnic communities within Georgia. 
 
Nana, Georgia: “There were two cases in Ninotsminda [where Armenians 
represent 96% of the population] and [the wider region of] Javakheti (94%), 
that are populated by ethnic minorities. There were attempts to have 
community radio stations - this was a huge project financed by BBC world 
trust service in 2006. Two years of the project went by just trying to gain a 
license, because the regulatory body just refused to grant the license and they 
were waiting for a response. The only thing they could do was place 
loudspeakers in the parks, where people would gather to hear news in their 
own language because they didn’t have a license. Then the project was 
closed down completely.” 
 
Gorda, Georgia: ‘Also, you’ve got to remember that most of these people are 
not fluent in Georgian, There’s a real, um…democratic deficit here. The 
Russian speaking community here is very large: Armenians and Azeris 
generally speak it too, I mean they speak Russian too, but they have may 
have problems following Russian news, which isn’t aimed at them anyway, so 
they are doubly marginalized and feel more connected with Armenian and 
Azeri issues.’ 
 
Nana, Georgia: ‘There is also another really notable development here. 
There’s a newly financed Russian language channel, with a strong web 
presence, which you would think would serve the Russian community in 
Georgia but in reality this channel is directed to north Caucasus and beyond 
to feed them good news from Georgia, how good Georgia is, you know. You 
don’t see Russian-speaking Georgians represented on this channel…their 
problems, er, how they live. Their interest is just in the Georgian government, 
how it tackles corruption….it’s basically an attempt to convey a positive 
message about Georgia.’ 
 
This refers to the PIK channel, accused of provocation by the Russians. 
Director General Robert Parsons said at the time: "It’s not our intention to 
antagonize Moscow. But of course if you have a monopoly over information 
and somebody arrives on the scene and breaks your monopoly, you’re going 
to find it irritating. And it’s our intention to break the Russian government’s 
monopoly over news. We make no secret of that," Foreign Ministry Deputy 
Minister Tornike Gordadze sees PIK as part of a larger Georgian policy to 
reach out to neighbouring groups in Russia. "Georgia has to promote its 
positive image to the North Caucasus to avoid another problem like this, if one 
day Russia wants to reinvade Georgia, the North Caucasians who are used in 
the adventure would think twice before following Russia.” (BBC, 2011) 
 
In the Ukrainian interviews, this initial leading question led in a different 
direction from the outset with most interviewees focusing representations of 
the East/West split in the country. The ethnic make-up of Ukraine is very 
different. In contrast to the South Caucasian ethnic and linguistic diversity 
exemplified by Georgia, the main cultural and linguistic divide is between 
Russian-speaking east and ‘European’, Ukrainian-speaking west. 
  
Maksym, Ukraine: ‘Let’s talk about the Ukrainska Pravda website again here. 
Pravda is pan-Ukrainian but… maybe…let’s say it would appeal in Lviv [in the 
Western Ukrainian heartland] more than Donetsk [in the industrial Russian-
speaking east]. I lived in Donetsk for two years and can say that people from 
Donetsk need, ah, what you might call…different news…they’re interested in 
different things. It is still more individualistic in the west, more collective in the 
east…where, er, er, they are…more likely to believe what they’re told, shall 
we say. In the mid 90s there were no journalists in the east, just localised 
versions of Russian newspapers. In western Ukraine we have lots of 
journalists who are popular personalities but journalists are not themselves 
opinion formers. In the east you do get articles which are anti-Ukrainian, no 
question, but I would say the west is not anti-Russian except Svoboda  [the 
Ukrainian nationalist party] and even they are not anti-Eastern Ukraine. The 
Russian media thinks Lviv is an anti-Russian centre but this surprises people 
in Lviv.’ 
 
Others, however, felt this split was overemphasised and even took exception 
to such generalisations, again relating them to what they saw as reductive 
media portrayals and, notably and without prompting, suggesting that online 
journalism has a role to play in narrowing the gap between East and West 
Ukraine. 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: ‘The divisions in Ukraine are much less noticeable online. In 
TV debates, some issues are sensitive – language, relations with Russia, the 
east/west split. But recently I’d say more people consider these issues less 
important than standards of living and the overall direction Ukraine moves in. 
There are lots of critical websites in Donetsk, for instance, which show 
problems in local politics. In fact I’d say eastern Ukraine has more powerful 
individual bloggers. People see them as an alternative source of information. 
There are one or two major Donetsk blogs that I know cover crucial issues 
and news. This east/west gap is much less noticeable online and [has 
diminished] in the last two years.’ 
 
This participant, along with some others, strongly refuted what he felt was a 
politically-inspired attempt to over-emphasise the divisions in Ukrainian 
society and particularly the ‘division’ between Russian east and Ukrainian 
west. Notably, this respondent and others felt that the reductive media 
coverage of this issue, and acceptance of the current Ukrainian regime’s 
political ‘line’ on the subject, was a problem in both domestic and foreign 
media. 
 
Vitaly, Ukraine: ‘Many voices across Ukraine are critical of the government 
online. But TV never shows voices from Donetsk [Eastern, Russian-speaking 
Ukraine] criticising the government. TV is interested in showing a divided 
country, whereas the Internet, the web world, hates this attempt to divide. I’d 
say TV is just infotainment in Ukraine, an illusion of democracy, er….even a 
kind of manipulation. It seems to be a place of discussion and open debate 
but there are two main problems. First, you have to make a distinction 
between real political opposition and opposition funded by government. Why 
is the opposition funded by the government? Because, um, because the 
government wants radical opposition like Ukrainian nationalists to deepen the 
gap between regions and cement its own power base in the industrial east’. 
 
Ukrainian nationalists like Svoboda were making some political headway at 
the time of the interviews. Seen as imposing values not appealing to eastern 
Ukraine, several participants mentioned its ‘convenience’ for the ruling party, 
which has its powerbase in the Russian-speaking East. 
 
Yevhen, Ukraine: ‘There is no East/West split – it’s created by journalists. 
People can read either language. It’s a question of quality. If there was a great 
idea in journalistic terms that would be popular – it doesn’t matter what 
language or area it’s aimed at.’ 
 
Tetyana, Ukraine: ‘My parents don’t buy papers any more. If a website wanted 
to find a broader audience, bridge the regional divide, we would share loads 
of values. I definitely think that the east/west differences are overplayed. 
We’re all interested in healthcare for instance. If someone wanted to find 
common ground they could. And we could, probably…distance ourselves from 
the nationalist dimension. The debate just isn’t happening – our national TV 
just has big entertainment shows. Svoboda is convenient for the ruling party – 
it diverts attention away from the immediate issues. It only comes up in local 
and regional news. Svoboda re-emphasises the…er, rhetoric of the east/west 
divide. We should try to unite the country around civic values. I sympathise 
with some of what Svoboda says but it is distracting.’ 
 
M, Ukraine: ‘The west characterises the issues, if they do it at all, badly. It’s 
not about the east/west split…actually all politicians are basically pro-
European. It’s not really possible to be a pro-Russian politician. All this is a 
smokescreen for the main reason they’re in parliament…to steal money. 
There’s no ideological reason at all. And when it comes to covering all this in 
the media it’s hard, especially for those of us working in print. Lots of people 
still see journalism as activism.’ 
 
This participant took a more critical line than most of the other respondents, 
but the clear balance of opinion among the Ukrainian journalists suggested 
that online journalism had an increasing tendency to question what they saw 
as politically-inspired attempts to emphasise the fault lines in Ukrainian culture 
and society. Similarly, whilst acknowledging the inevitable resource issues, 
the Georgian journalists all emphasised the real or potential role that online 
journalism had in articulating the perspectives of minority linguistic and ethnic 
groups within the country. 
 
Conclusion: The democratizing potential of independent ‘hub’ websites 
 
The evolution of what might be called the ‘Anglocentric’ analysis of the 
democratizing potential of online media has gone through several distinct 
phases. Discussion initially revolved around whether new media could be 
trusted, and then evolved to consider whether new media threatened 
journalistic professionalism. It gradually moved on to considerations of 
whether it would destroy the mainstream press. Then came a gradual 
acceptance that blogs were simply an adjunct to the mainstream press, 
adding diversity but lacking real impact. However, this article argues that such 
debates are more relevant in the Anglosphere and that the role of online 
journalism in its broadest sense is potentially highly politically significant in 
more obviously deficient media environments. Further, it suggests and 
perhaps goes some way towards demonstrating that the clearest indication of 
this significance is currently seen in the ‘semi-free’ journalistic environments 
of ‘west facing’ parts of the former Soviet Union, particularly those countries 
like Georgia and Ukraine that experienced ‘colour revolutions’ almost a 
decade ago, where demands for a free press played a central role and 
continue to underpin political debate. 
 
In these environments, there are signs of a coalescing around what could be 
described as ‘hub’ websites. It is worth stressing again that such sites are not 
blogs: they echo but transcend the blogging format. They are, rather, 
independently funded sources of online political journalism that have identified 
and deliberately address shortcomings in the mainstream news media. 
Websites such as Netgazeti and Liberali in Georgia, and Ukrainska Pravda in 
Ukraine, are a genuinely alternative media response to topical political issues 
and echo similar examples in entirely different media contexts (for instance, 
WalesHome, which addresses a structurally deficient media environment in 
post-devolution Wales, and Nawaat.org which functions as a post-‘Arab 
Spring’ hub for Tunisian political journalism). They are all deliberate and 
overtly journalistic attempts to circumvent the mainstream press and often do 
the job of conveying political information more effectively than conventional 
journalism in these environments. Further, they act as a filtering system for 
the mass of information deriving from social media like Twitter and Facebook, 
as well as conveying and collating the perspectives of individual bloggers. 
They have, in other words, assumed an editorial or gatekeeping role, 
channelling online opinion through professional journalistic techniques. 
Beckett (2008) argues that the distinction between weblogs and traditional 
media is becoming increasingly blurred as journalism goes online, while 
Roberts (2010) suggests that, in many different contexts, an advanced, hybrid 
form of ‘web-based journalism’ is developing, a form that begins to set a wider 
media agenda. Beckett (2008) suggests that, instead of the old polarity, it is 
more useful to think in terms of Personal Bloggers and Journalist Bloggers 
who are both effectively ‘networked journalists’. Numbers accessing these 
‘hub’ sites may be relatively low, but in small-scale media environments their 
influence on the mainstream and on the wider political agenda is magnified, 
and, echoing Megenta (2011) in the context of authoritarian African regimes, 
the numbers are not necessarily the most relevant issue. Rather, it is a 
question of influence, of who and what those engaged readers represent. 
 
Hanitzsch et al (2011) found several similarities between contemporary 
journalistic cultures in varied contexts worldwide, in particular the global 
primacy of role perceptions that are characterized by detachment and non-
involvement. Acting as government watchdog also seemed a universal 
aspiration, alongside a consensus regarding the adherence to universal 
principles to be followed regardless of context. The triangular relationship 
between the state, the citizen and the public sphere remains at the heart of all 
such debates about the value and role of journalism. Habermas’s contested 
views on the public sphere arguably remain core to media theory and 
inevitably remain relevant in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ – notwithstanding 
the cautionary writings of Schudson (2008) who points out that journalism has 
long existed outside democracy and that journalism does not by itself produce 
or provide democracy. Indeed, several writers are critical of the tendency to 
cite Habermas’ notion of the public sphere without reference to the contextual 
specificity: the emerging middle class in C17/18 Western Europe (Louw, 
2010, for instance). It remains a useful shorthand, however, as, in most 
idealistic interpretations part of journalism’s purpose is to encourage civic 
participation, improve public debate and enhance public life without sacrificing 
the independence of a free press. For Habermas (1989), that brief moment in 
time represented a period when political action was driven by ‘authentic public 
opinion’ as opposed to manufactured and/or manipulated public opinion.  
 
The words of Ruslan, one of the Ukrainian interviews, seem pertinent in this 
context, as he articulates the pseudo-Habermasian idealism inherent in the 
kind of hyperlocal web-based journalism now gaining a foothold in parts of 
provincial Ukraine. ‘Traditional papers are not doing well in Ukrainian regions 
– even in small cities people are moving to the web for news. Print media tend 
to be oblast owned, same as they were in the Soviet era, with small print runs. 
So the pan-Ukrainian sites like Pravda take over as a news source. But it’s 
not just that: there are also successful local examples – in Sumi an interesting 
project substitutes existing old media with a news website. Journalists 
everywhere are doing hyperlocal political journalism. Local (mainstream) 
journalists used to write about the local Communist party so they still think this 
is what their audience wants. There’s no tradition to write about real local 
issues. Journalists talk about local politicians at the expense of, say, potholes 
in the road. People are tired of political talkshows, disappointed in traditional 
media and its capacity to explain world around them. It’s detached from reality 
hence the popularity of social networks and hence the popularity and 
importance of Ukrainska Pravda. Online, journalists can write and say what 
they think and write things they can’t do in their [mainstream] articles.’  
 
Despite the optimism inherent in such comments, cynicism about web-based 
journalism remains, and much of it is well founded. In the contexts outlined 
above, however, it could be argued that such criticisms are less pertinent, 
partly because many political blogs directly address concerns about the 
mainstream media and therefore position themselves differently at the outset. 
While political blogs and online ‘hubs’ are certainly not immune from self-
referential naval gazing and are often highly partisan, free as they are from 
legislative and editorial constraints, this paper argues that the best examples 
are a valuable addition to the news media. This is particularly true if we 
consider online political journalism in its broadest sense, in which some sites 
specifically intend to provide a space for the kind of debate that is lacking in 
the mainstream press and therefore deliberately place more emphasis on 
objectivity, analysis and interactivity. There is a sense, increasingly frequently 
justified, that this could represent a form of 'solution' to the ‘problem’ 
represented by the shortcomings of the mainstream press. 
  
For optimists, the democratic potential of the web can be genuinely harnessed 
by these forms, which may not herald the end of the mainstream news 
monopoly on information, but can at least enrich the public sphere. Globally, 
there are much earlier precedents for the notion of countering perceived 
deficiencies in the mainstream media by attempting to exploit the interactivity 
offered by web-based technology. Arguably the most famous was the 1999 
launch of OhMyNews in South Korea with the tagline: 'Every citizen is a 
journalist'. Founder Oh Yeon-Ho expressed his frustration with the 'haughty 
attitude common in the Korean media' by involving more than 700 'citizen 
reporters' in his attempt to circumvent the mainstream Korean press and 
supply news from their own perspectives. That number grew to 32,000 within 
four years and the project continues to attract global attention for what Oh 
calls a ‘revolution in the culture of news production and consumption’ (Oh, 
2009). 
 Further, some of the traditional scepticism about blogging and online 
journalism in the academic and journalistic communities is beginning to be 
questioned by those with a different perspective on these issues. These 
criticisms are worthy of note, as they question the validity of academic caution 
in relation to the rapid evolution of the online environment. The Guardian's 
web editor Emily Bell, for instance, ended a recent review with the following 
critique of research into online journalism. 'Unlinked and frozen in time, its 
weighty discourse is undermined by its immutable nature. Some of the bigger 
themes of normative news agendas and democratic purpose are truly worthy 
of expansion, while some of the more micro observations about journalism 
and politics already seem dated and dispensable.’ (Bell, 2010). In the context 
of media and political environments like Ukraine and Georgia, such criticisms 
are highly pertinent, illustrating as they do the difficulty of applying cogent 




Acknowledgement: This study was made possible by the award of a research 




Agre, P. (2002) “Real-time politics: the Internet and the political process”, The 
Information Society, 18, pp. 31-31.  
Ahmed, A (2012) “Putin’s challenge: The Circassians and the Winter 
Olympics”, Retrieved from: www.aljazeera.com (last accessed: April 2012) 
Atton, C., and Hamilton, J. (2011) Alternative Journalism. London: Sage. 
BBC (2012) ‘Russian-language Georgian TV to start broadcasting’, 25 
January. Retrieved from: www.bbc.com (last accessed: April 2012) 
Beckett, C. (2008) Supermedia: Saving Journalism So It Can Save the World. 
London:Wiley-Blackwell. 
Beckett, C. (2010) The Value of Networked Journalism. London: LSE/Polis. 
Bell, E. (2010) “Review of new media, old news (Fenton)”, British Journalism 
Review, 21, 1, 83. 
Berger, G. (2009) “How the internet impacts on international news: exploring 
paradoxes of the most global medium in a time of ‘hyperlocalism’”, The 
International Communication Gazette, 71, 5, pp. 366-76) 
Blumler, J., and Coleman, S. (2001) Realising Democracy Online: A Civic 
Commons in Cyberspace. London: Institute of Public Policy Research. 
Clarke, H. and Schober, M. (1992) ‘Asking questions and influencing 
answers’, in J. Tanner (ed.) Questions about questions: Inquiries into the 
cognitive bases of surveys. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992. 
Coleman, S. and Blumler, J. (2009) The Internet and Democratic Citizenship. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
Companjen, F. (2010) “Georgia”. In D.O’Beachain and Polese, A. (eds.), The 
Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. 
Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 13-30. 
Copsey, N. (2010) “Ukraine”. In D.O’Beachain and Polese, A. (eds.), The 
Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. 
Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 30-45. 
Cushion, S., Lewis, J., and Groves, C. (2009) “Reflecting the Four Nations? 
An Analysis of Reporting Devolution on UK Network News Media”, Journalism 
Studies, 10. 5, pp.1-17. 
Davies, G. (2009) Media in Wales: Serving Public Values? Cardiff 
De Waal, T. (2010) The Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Drezner, D., and Farrell, H. (2004) “The power and politics of blogs”. 
Retrieved from: http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca (last accessed: December 2011) 
Economist (2012) No Half Time Oranges for Victor (5 May) 
Fielden, L. (2012) Regulating the Press: A Comparative Study of International 
Press Councils. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism/University of Oxford. 
Fossato, F. and Lloyd, J. (2008) The Web that Failed: How Opposition Politics 
and Independent Initiatives are Failing on the Internet in Russia. Oxford: 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism/University of Oxford. 
Franklin, B. (1997) Newszak and News Media. London: Hodder Arnold. 
Freedom House (2011) Freedom of the Press Report. Retrieved from: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report (last accessed: April 2012) 
Furmagalli, M. and Tordjman, S. (2010) “Uzbekistan”. In D.O’Beachain and 
Polese, A. (eds.), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: 
Successes and Failures. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 156-177. 
Garton Ash, T. (2004) Free World. London: Penguin.  
Geniets, A. (2011) Trust in International News Media in Partially Free Media 
Environments. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism/University 
of Oxford. 
Gilmor, D. (2004) We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the people, for the 
people. New York: O’Reilly. 
Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hanitzsch, T. et al (2011) Mapping Journalism Cultures across Nations. 
Journalism Studies, 12:3, 273-293. 
Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: three models of 
media and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s Consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, 
institutions and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Jakubowitz, K. (2001) Rude Awakening: Social and media change in Central 
and Eastern Europe. New York: Hampton Press. 
Kovacic, M. and Erjavec, K. (2008) Mobi journalism in Slovenia: Is this really 
citizen journalism? Journalism Studies 9:6, 874-890. 
Kostanyan, H. and Tsertsvadze, T. (2012) The Fading Rose of Georgia’s 
Revolution: Will elections bring fresh hope? Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies. 
Lasica, J. (2003) “Blogs and Journalism need each other”, Nieman Reports, 
Fall 2003, 70-75. 
Lievrouw, L. (2011) Alternative and Activist New Media. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Locke, J. (1966) The Second Treatise of Government, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Louw, E. (2010) The Media and Political Process. London: Sage. 
Mason, P. (2012) Why it’s kicking off everywhere: The new global revolutions. 
London: Verso. 
McNair, B. (2000) Journalism and Democracy: An evaluation of the political 
public sphere. London: Routledge. 
Megenta, A. (2011) Can it Tweet its way to Democracy? The Promise of 
Participatory Media in Africa. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism. 
Messner, M., and DiStasto, M. (2008) “The source cycle: How traditional 
media and weblogs use each other as sources”, Journalism Studies, 9, 3, 
447-63. 
Minority Rights Group International (2009) Breaking the Cycle of Exclusion: 
Minority Rights in Georgia Today. London: Minority Rights Group 
International. 
Morley, D. (1980) The ‘Nationwide’ Audience: Structure and Decoding, 
London : BFI. 
Newman, N. (2009) The rise of social media and its impact on mainstream 
journalism, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. 
O’Beachain, D. and Polese, A., eds. (2010), The Colour Revolutions in the 
Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Oh Yeon (http://international.ohmynews.com: last accessed: April 2012) 
Reese, S., Rutigliano, L., Hyun, K. and Jeong, J. (2009) “Mapping the 
Blogosphere: Professional and citizen-based media in the global news arena”, 
Journalism, 8:3, 235-51. 
Reid. A. (1998) Borderland: A journey through the history of Ukraine. Basic 
Books. 
Robakidze, N. (2011) “Georgia: Immature Media”. Caucasus Analytical 
Digest, No.25, 18 March. 
Roberts, S. (2011) ‘“Postcode lottery”: The future of cross-border media in 
post-devolution Wales’, in D. Hutchinson and H. O’Donnell (eds.), Centres 
and Peripheries: Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Journalism in the 21st 
Century, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Sambrook, R. (2006) “How the net is transforming news”, BBC News Online, 
20 January: http://news.bbc.co.uk 
Schudson, M (2008), Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press, 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Seib (2002) The global journalist: News and conscience in a world of conflict, 
Lanahm MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Shafer, R. and Freedman, E. (2003) Press Constraints as Obstacles to 
Establishing Civil Societies in Central Asia. Journalism Studies, 10:6, 851-
869.  
Smith, K. and McConville, B. (2011) How the media marginalised the 
economic roots of the ‘Arab Spring’, in J.Mair and R.Keeble (eds.), Mirage in 
the Desert? Reporting the ‘Arab Spring’, Bury St Edmunds: Abramis. 
Splichal, S. (2001) Access denied: Freedom of information in the information 
age, Ames: Iowa State University Press. 
Splichal, S. and Sparks, C. (1994) Journalists for the 21st century: tendencies 
of professionalization among first year students in 22 countries. Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex. 
Stromback, J. (2006) “In Search of a Standard: Four models of democracy 
and their normative implications for journalism”, Journalism Studies, 6:3, 331-
345. 
Suchman, L. and Jordan, B. (1992) in J. Tanner (ed.), Questions about 
questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases of surveys, New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation  
Tuchman, G. (1978) Making News. New York: Free Press. 
The Week (2012) 3 March 2012 
Yerevan Press Club/Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (2011) Media 
Landscapes of Eastern Partnership Countries. Retrieved from: www.ypc.am 
(last accessed: April 2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
